Revenge or the government

By: Issam Khoury

Mar 13, 2025

The transitional authority led by Ahmad al-Shara, “Abu Muhammad al-Julani,” initiated a series of layoffs for temporary contract employees, and the army and security forces associated with Bashar al-Assad’s regime were dissolved, leaving this large segment, mostly from the Alawite community, without any salaries. This reality led to dissatisfaction among the Alawites with the new regime, compounded by a series of individual incidents that targeted members of this community as a form of revenge for their previous role in supporting Bashar al-Assad.

All these factors pushed many from this community to embrace the armed movement led by Brigadier General Ghassan Suleiman Dala, known as the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria,” which launched its combat operations in the form of guerrilla warfare targeting military checkpoints of the Syrian security forces in several areas of Syria, from the countryside of Homs to the Syrian coast, since the beginning of March 2025. On March 6, 2025, the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria” made a clear appearance by raiding the military checkpoints of the public security in the city of Jableh and its countryside, and occupying the naval academy, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 120 security personnel.

The Damascus authority led by Ahmad al-Shara called for military mobilization against this armed rebellion, referring to the leaders of this rebellion as “remnants of the regime.” Notably, this mobilization did not come solely from jihadist Islamic factions but also from general mosques. During Ramadan, for the Muslim community, martyrdom in battles is seen as an opportunity to enter paradise, which motivated hundreds of young men to volunteer in a war that took on a religious and revengeful character, as the Sunni community, which is the majority, views itself as oppressed throughout the rule of both father and son Assad. Thus, the opportunity to attack the “remnants of the regime” became a chance for revenge against the Alawites in general. This led to horrific massacres affecting women, children, and the elderly. In the village of Sinoubar Jableh, all the men were asked to come out and were killed. The variety of killings on that day reached, by March 13, 2025, a number of civilian Alawite victims according to the Center for Environmental and Social Development, amounting to 864, and this number is certainly subject to increase due to the inability to reach all villages, with some villages becoming empty of their fleeing residents. In any case, this number is distributed across the following villages:

(Village of al-Shayr: 63, al-Da’tour area: 68, Village of al-Shamiya: 7, Village of al-Hataniya “countryside of Qadmous”: 14, Village of al-Rasafa “Masyaf”: 40, Village of al-Hakim: 70, Sinoubar Jableh: 207, Village of Ain al-Arus: 44, Village of al-Hanadi: 4, Village of al-Mukhtariya: 137, Village of al-Tawim: 33, Village of Bustan al-Basha: 12, City of Baniyas: 128, Harisun: 24, Al-Ruimiyah: 2, Deir Mama: 3, Shablu: 3, Karam Ma’sari: 2, Bayt Jabru: 1, Al-Muzayri’ah: 2)

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on March 12, 2025, that the number of dead reached 1,383 victims due to 44 attacks on Alawite villages.

Of course, the mechanism of killing was barbaric and chaotic; it did not only target Alawites but also affected three Christian figures, one of whom was “Jihad Antonios Bishara” in Baniyas. His house was raided by fighters from Uzbekistan, and when they realized he was Christian, they released him, but they attempted to steal his son’s car. When he went out to the street to prevent them, he was hit by a stray bullet and killed.

Additionally, both “Antoine Qouad Botros and his son Fadi Antoine Botros” were killed on the Qasab-Latakia road. It is noteworthy that their last name is known to any Syrian as a Christian surname (Peter= Botros), but they were killed because their identity card contained the phrase “born in Qardaha,” which is the village of former President Hafez al-Assad, predominantly Alawite. This suggests that those who killed them were foreign jihadists loyal to Ahmad al-Shara.

These examples demonstrate the chaos of the attack, where Muslim youths participated with foreign jihadists in the battles, and the security forces loyal to Ahmad al-Shara appeared unable to comprehend the event. From one angle, they needed the help of these jihadists, and from another angle, they were incapable of organizing their armed attack.

Even after the battles ended, and Ahmad al-Shara asked the attackers to leave the coastal areas, their departure was destructive, as they fired gunshots at any house they passed by, aiming to instill social terror among the Alawites. They also published several disgusting videos mocking the Alawites by referring to them as pigs, which is an unclean animal in both Islamic and Jewish cultures.

Overall, these events provided conclusive evidence that Ahmad al-Shara and his Ministry of Defense lacked the ability to control their military forces. The factions that announced they would join the Ministry of Defense, such as the National Army factions, came to the coast without coordination with the Ministry of Defense, as they did not carry the banner of the Syrian Arab Army but rather the banners of their military factions. For example, the Zinki faction was responsible for violations in the village of “Harison,” while the Sultan Murad Brigade was responsible for violations in the village of Al-Sheir. Meanwhile, foreign jihadist fighters were posting videos of threats from their vehicles, portraying the large crowds of fighters as a victory for Islam over the infidel Alawites, referred to as “Nusairis.”

This discourse broadcasted on social media received higher promotion through an operations room managing the electronic war for Brigadier General “Ghassan Suleiman Dala,” which broadcast a flood of fabricated videos aimed at stirring religious fanaticism among the Alawite community. This room called on Alawites to appeal to world nations for international protection and urged them to head to the Russian Hmeimim base to request Russian intervention. Through our investigation of these videos, we found that some were filmed in Lebanon and others in Iraq.

Certainly, these videos do not negate the heinous crime against the Alawites, but they show that Brigadier General “Ghassan Suleiman Dala” and his team did not anticipate this large attack from the Sunnis and were expecting only minor violations. Therefore, they prepared a series of videos to exaggerate the event internationally, allowing them to impose their dominance over the entire Syrian coast.

The plan of Brigadier General “Ghassan Suleiman Dala” failed, but it yielded results that surprised the Iranians who support him. It became clear to us that the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria” includes, alongside Brigadier General “Ghassan Suleiman Dala”, both “Mohammad Mahrez Jaber”, the former leader of the “Desert Hawks” forces, and “Yasser Ramadan Al-Hajl”, the former field commander of the 25th Division led by Suhail Hassan.

It is known that Brigadier General Ghassan Dala is the commander of the 42nd Brigade known as the “Al-Ghaith Forces” in the former Syrian army, and he is one of the prominent military leaders in the Fourth Division led by Maher Al-Assad.

It is likely that the operations room for this battle is in an area loyal to Hezbollah within Lebanese territory, but supporters of Ahmad Al-Shara, especially those loyal to Turkey, have suggested that the command of operations is in northeastern Syria, and that the SDF forces funded this operation in cooperation with Tehran. There has been talk about the necessity of utilizing the large military mobilization of Arab Sunnis to direct it militarily towards Kurdish areas.

However, this rumor collapsed on March 11, 2025, after both Mazloum Abdi and Ahmad Al-Shara signed an agreement that included a clause stating “support for the state in its fight against the remnants of Assad and all threats to its security and unity.” This confirmed that the operations room is not in northeastern Syria, so the ideal location for it is in Lebanon or in Iraqi Popular Mobilization areas.

Of course, Abdi’s agreement with al-Shara offered a glimmer of hope for the Alawites on the Syrian coast, as they requested that the SDF manage their areas’ security until the Syrian army is restructured and capable security forces emerge to maintain order and reject the vengeful rhetoric of extremist Islamist fighters. These demands stem from the Alawites’ lack of trust in the Sunni component and their fear of a recurrence of such operations, especially given that Ahmad al-Shara’s state is fragile.