The Syrian People’s Council: Between Change and Noise

By: Issam Khoury

May 17, 2024

المقال باللغة العربية

Many opponents of the Syrian president describe the members of the Syrian People’s Council as “A puppet council.” Therefore, the Syrian opposition did not comment on the elections of the Syrian People’s Council, which are scheduled to be held on July 15, 2024, based on Presidential Decree No. 99 of 2024.

The People’s Council consists of 250 members. Article 53 of the 1973 constitution stipulates that at least half of the members of the People’s Council should be workers and peasants. This provision was reiterated in the second paragraph of Article 60 of the 2012 constitution, issued during Bashar al-Assad’s presidency, and in Article 22 of the General Elections Law No. 5 of 2014. This arrangement allocates 127 parliamentary representatives to workers and peasants, while the rest of the population gets 123 parliamentary representatives.

Syria appears to be a secular country in the media, but in reality, it is a state immersed in sectarian details. Security is imposed through the political authority represented by a party alliance called the “National Democratic Front,” led by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, which is the leading party in the state and society according to the Syrian constitution. There is an undisclosed sectarian distribution of positions. Traditionally, since the time of Hafez al-Assad and continuing into the rule of his son, Bashar al-Assad, the Sunni majority (70% of Syria’s population) has been allocated 171 Sunni parliamentary representatives in all Syrian provinces, while Alawites (7-11% of Syria’s population) get 39 parliamentary representatives distributed across four provinces. The Christian community (8-13% of Syria’s population) is allocated 23 parliamentary representatives distributed across ten provinces, and the Druze community (1-3% of Syria’s population) gets nine parliamentary representatives, six of whom are from the Suwayda Governorate. The Shia community (1% of Syria’s population) is allocated five parliamentary representatives, the Ismaili community (1% of Syria’s population) gets one parliamentary representative, and the Murshidite sect (1% of Syria’s population) gets one parliamentary representative.

Parliamentary representation also takes into account national, ethnic, and tribal sentiments in Syrian society. Positions are distributed within each sect according to tribal weight. For example, among the Alawite sect, clans following the Kalaziyya religious faction receive a higher proportion of parliamentary representation compared to Alawites following the Haydariyya faction, due to the higher demographic presence of the Kalaziyya. This religious faction is also followed by the ruling Assad family. Parliamentary positions are also distributed among followers of the Kalaziyya faction based on their tribal affiliations (e.g., the Kalbiyya, Haddadin, Khayyat, and Mutawarra). If a member of these tribes does not secure a parliamentary position, it is certain that another member of the tribe will obtain a ministerial position.

Due to their absence from a specific geographic area and their presence across the Syrian provinces, Christians are unable to garner votes from a large number of their community members. Therefore, the National Democratic Front imposes the appointment of Christian representatives within its electoral lists. These lists consistently achieve a 100% success rate, to the extent that Syrians feel the election results are inconsequential. It is evident that the Syrian security apparatus determines the lists of the National Democratic Front. If the Syrian security apparatus decides to nominate an individual to be part of the National Democratic Front’s lists, that individual cannot refuse or evade the appointment, or else they will be accused of betrayal and dereliction of duty to the nation and its leader.

The number of candidates in the National Democratic Front’s lists is fewer than the allocated parliamentary seats in each province, allowing limited electoral competition from another category known as independents. Typically, these independents are wealthy individuals, businessmen, or public figures who must receive support from security leaders for their electoral campaigns; otherwise, they risk losing their parliamentary aspirations. This category is also linked to the Syrian security apparatus or appointed by it to facilitate commercial or industrial deals that benefit the security leaders.

The only religious group marginalized in parliamentary representation are followers of the Yazidi faith. The Syrian state does not recognize this religion, and followers of this faith (around 13,000 people) are classified in official records as Sunni Muslims.

Possible tasks of members of the People’s Assembly

The possible tasks of the members of the People’s Council have not included any constitutional amendments related to sovereign matters in governance since President Hafez al-Assad assumed power in Syria, except for the 2000 constitutional amendment that allowed the installation of President Bashar al-Assad’s son as his successor. This change adjusted the presidential age limit to 34 years from the previous 40 years.

In practice, none of the People’s Council members dare to criticize any proposed resolution due to the ease with which Syrian security forces can arrest and tarnish their reputation, as seen with deputies Mamoun al-Homsi and Riad Seif during the Damascus Spring period.

Hence, the tasks of the People’s Council have become limited to conveying popular demands to authorities and ministers, primarily concerning service-related issues such as electricity and sewage networks in certain areas, educational development projects in remote regions, or enhancing tourism facilities in alignment with demographic changes.

Regarding foreign affairs and international relations, the majority of People’s Council members echo the political and security leadership’s speeches regarding countering Israel, the American imperial project targeting Syria and supporting the resistance axis represented by Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Syrian regime.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, which escalated into a civil war, Sunni deputies have been incapacitated in providing services to security forces to quell public anger. They have refrained from demanding the release of any detainees. Conversely, some minority deputies have acted as intermediaries with security personnel to ascertain the fate of detainees. Some even covertly sought to include names of detainees in presidential pardon decrees. The presence of minorities in the Syrian People’s Council has been beneficial to oppressed Syrian civilians, albeit these services were paid for by the families of the abducted and detained individuals, contributing to the widespread corruption in Syria.

Expected changes in the People’s Council in 2024

Despite entire provinces being out of the control of the Syrian regime, such as Idlib, Hasakah, Raqqa, and Suwayda, the Syrian regime insisted on appointing representatives for those provinces to the People’s Council, signaling that those provinces are part of Syria, and the entities that control those areas are occupying forces with no legitimate authority to administer those provinces.

The Syrian regime has also not changed the level of representation of Syrian deputies for any province, even though many provinces have seen a decrease in their population due to the extensive damage to their urban structures and infrastructure. Additionally, the demographic population in Syria has significantly changed due to the displacement of over 6.5 million people from Syria, and all these displaced individuals are absent from the electoral process. Therefore, it is clear that the Syrian regime seeks to avoid any political changes in the country in order to appear balanced in terms of sectarian and national representation in front of its population base.

A notable change in the People’s Council occurred in 2017 with the appointment of a Christian-origin president of the People’s Council. This position was traditionally held by a Sunni figure since the era of President Hafez al-Assad, specifically a figure from the city of Damascus. Perhaps this change was aimed at pleasing the Russians and sending a message to the West that Christians hold leadership positions in the Assad-led state.

According to Ayman Abdel Nour, former advisor to the Syrian president and currently a defector, the Christian community has been politically damaged. It used to be customary to appoint or elect a Christian member to the top leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, but this practice was changed, with the renaming of the top leadership to the Central Leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in 2018. In the recent elections for the Central Leadership, only Deputy Hamouda Sabbagh, a Christian, obtained a position due to his role as the president of the People’s Council.

Aymen, from the Czech-Slovak Institute of Oriental Studies, adds that the presence of Hamouda Sabbagh, of Christian origins, in the central leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party is solely due to his position as President of the Syrian People’s Council. Therefore, if the 2024 elections result in a non-Christian president of the People’s Council, Christians will lose their political position in the central leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, which would indeed be a significant setback in the political representation of Syrian Christians.

Moreover, lawyer Mohannad Al-Hasani clarified that the Syrian regime is not concerned with reducing the representation of minority groups in parliament, but it has reduced the political powers of the Sunni majority by abolishing the position of the president of the People’s Council held by Sunnis. The regime has also appointed several Alawite officers to security administrations that were traditionally held by Sunnis, such as the National Security Office, previously known as the National Security Bureau. Therefore, if there is a change in parliamentary representation, it may affect Sunni representation.

Overall, Syrian Christians are generally not heavily involved in Syrian military life due to being a minority dispersed across various Syrian provinces. They are wary of sectarian animosity between Shia and Sunni communities and prefer not to be involved. As a result, most Christian families have sent their children abroad, and those who have settled abroad are unlikely to return to Syria, a country torn apart and administratively dysfunctional.

In conclusion, it can be inferred from the perspectives of Abdel Nour and Al-Hasani that this year the Syrian regime may renew a Christian figure as the president of the Syrian People’s Council to maintain sectarian balance in the Central Leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. Failure to do so may result in marginalized political status for Christians. This could potentially lead to a reduction in Christian representation in the People’s Council this year or in future parliamentary sessions, with Christians being replaced by Alawite or Shia figures, especially as the Shia population has been growing in Syria, particularly in Damascus and its suburbs, as well as in Homs.

The security turmoil and Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon this year have also led to the displacement of over 200 Shiite Lebanese families towards the outskirts of the capital, Damascus. Although these families have not obtained Syrian citizenship, many Hezbollah fighters and their families have acquired Syrian IDs during their military operations in Syrian territories. This could potentially increase the Shiite demographic in Syria. If the security disturbances persist in southern Lebanon, these families and others are capable of obtaining Syrian IDs, given the evident leniency of the Syrian government towards Iranian demands and the extensive influence of Hezbollah within Syrian decision-making circles.

The Druze Syrians have kept their children away from compulsory service in areas outside the province of Al-Suwayda, and they are currently threatened by the Syrian regime and Iranian militias. There is no influence of the Druze deputies on the uprising against the Syrian regime in the province of Al-Suwayda, and no Druze political or economic figure with respectable roots dare to change the opinion of the Druze street in the province of Al-Suwayda.

Within the policy of stick and carrot adopted by the regime towards the Sunni Syrians, it was expected to do the same with the Druze, by reducing their security or parliamentary representation in the People’s Council. However, this is impossible because the majority of the people in the province of Al-Suwayda are Druze. Therefore, the Syrian regime resorted to appointing a new governor for Al-Suwayda, Major General Akram Ali Mohammed, known for his security relations with Hezbollah fighters and the Fatemiyoun militia during the battles in Aleppo when he was head of the State Security Administration in Aleppo. This indicates that the Druze deputies who will be appointed in the electoral play directed by Major General Akram will be from the opposition factions to the movement, and may demand the People’s Council to suppress their people in Al-Suwayda with an iron fist.

The rest of the minorities will not be affected in their parliamentary representation, as their representation is generally low. It is expected that the Syrian regime will take into account the level of Sunni parliamentary representation in the elections on July 15, 2024, especially since a number of Sunni Arab countries have restored their relations with Syria, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This year, parliamentary representatives will have important and special roles in media, foreign relations, and economic deals, as many Syrian security and political figures are now listed on the American and European sanctions lists, and many of them do not dare to travel by non-Syrian airlines for fear of arrest by Interpol. Therefore, the Syrian security establishment will prepare a section of Syrian parliamentarians to play this role, and it is the duty of the opponents of the Syrian regime to monitor these individuals and report any violations they commit, as they are the new arms of the security regime towards the outside.